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Abstract
In 1569, Pius v dispatched an expeditionary force to assist the royal armies in the Third 
War of Religion in France. This was the background against which the Jesuit Anto-
nio Possevino, commissioned by Superior General Francisco de Borja and the mili-
tant pope himself, published Il soldato christiano, a short book that outlined a spiritual 
model of the disciplined soldier, far from previous heroic and aristocratic archetypes. 
Copies of the catechism were distributed to the officers and chaplains who accom-
panied the contingent. This essay aims to analyze the conditions in which the papal 
military intervention in France was conceived and the effects of Jesuit catechesis on 
the men who made up the papal army, as well as their reactions to this encroachment 
of “confessionalization” into the profession of arms.
Keywords
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 chaplains – Wars of Religion – Catechisms – Battle of Moncontour – Huguenots
In the last days of March 1569, the news of the Catholic victory at the battle 
of Jarnac, fought between Henry of Anjou’s royal troops and Huguenot forces, 
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reached Rome with extraordinary speed.1 In the cities and territories of the 
 Papal States, intensive efforts were underway to prepare an expeditionary 
force that the pontiff had decided to send to France. Every piece of informa-
tion regarding the new war of religion, the third to take place on French soil, 
was received with special attention.2 Since his election in 1565, Pius v had striv-
en vigorously for the restoration of religious unity in France. To his visionary 
sensibility, it was a goal that represented just one stage in an eschatological 
and titanic struggle against the emissaries of Evil. It could only be achieved 
through the beneficial intervention of the Lord, solicited through a general pu-
rification of the faithful and their total adherence to the Church’s teaching.3 
The treatment for heretics, for those subverters of Divine order, could only be 
the penalty indicated in Deuteronomy 20, in which God condemned his en-
emies to total destruction. The pope seemed to refer explicitly to this passage 
when, communicating with Charles ix (r.1560–74) in order to congratulate him 
on his victory and on the death of the rebel leader, Louis de Condé (1530–69), 
he incited the king “to pursue and destroy all that remains of the enemy, to 
extirpate utterly the roots of an evil so terrible and so obstinate even unto its 
tiniest fibres.” Since the king had in the past shown signs of being overly ac-
commodating, the pope reminded him, rather threateningly, of the story of 
Saul: having violated the divine commandment to carry out the extermination 
of the Amalekites, he had provoked God’s wrath and brought disgrace upon his 
house (1 Sam. 15:8–29).4
The sacralization of the war, implemented by the most energetic and un-
compromising pope of the Counter-Reformation, was conveyed through the 
re-appropriation of a religious imagery that drew on some particularly violent 
Old Testament texts. The language of Pius v was saturated with such  references, 
1 The report of the battle by the nuncio Mirto Frangipani (Metz, March 21), in Archivum Secre-
tum Vaticanum [hereafter asv], Miscellanea [Misc.], Armadio [Arm.] ii, 34, f. 214r-v. Detailed 
description of the battle, like that of Edmond Auger, who was an eyewitness, had already 
reached Rome. arsi, Gall., 82, 35.
2 Numerous reports from different theatres of war are gathered in the avvisi collected in Biblio-
teca Apostolica Vaticana [hereafter bav], Urbinati Latini [Urb. Lat.], 1040–41. For a more de-
tailed analysis, see Gianclaudio Civale, “‘Non nobis Domine’: Religione, disciplina e violenza 
nel corpo di spedizione pontificia nella Francia della terza guerra di religione,” in Battaglie: 
L’evento, l’individuo, la memoria, ed. Alessandro Buono and Gianclaudio Civale (Palermo: 
Mediterranea, 2014), 141–48.
3 On Pius v’s French policy, see Charles Hirschauer, La politique de saint Pie v en France 
( 1566–1572) (Paris: Boccard, 1923).
4 Letter of Pius v to Charles ix, March 28, 1569, in Franciscus Goubau, Apostolicarum Pii Quinti 
Pont. Max. epistolarum libri quinque (Antwerp: Plantin-Moretus, 1640), 3:151–53.
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his letters addressed to earthly authorities echoing with vibrant reminders of 
Elijah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Ezra. The pontiff, who was no stranger to the 
current of prophetic millenarianism permeating the Dominican order,5 often 
thundered out like a prophet, warning monarchs and prelates not to close their 
eyes to the proliferation of the heretical plague. However, the mandate to de-
fend the faith and the church, to exercise divine justice, did not extend only to 
the Christian rulers and magistrates, but also to those, such as the captains and 
soldiers, who were called upon to carry it out. This resulted in a re-definition of 
military duty in line with scriptural example. Pius v had outlined the details of 
this in a letter to the Duke of Alba (1507–82) in December 1568, after the defeat 
of the Flemish rebels led by William of Orange (1533–84). It was an arduous 
undertaking to make something pious and devoted of a soldier’s work, a mat-
ter of “dextere sinistram vertere” (to turn the left skil dexterously), making a 
heavenly enterprise from worldly labor; of sanctifying the activity of war and 
consecrating it to God.6 The warrior thereby could become the Lord’s cham-
pion, securing to himself the eternal glory of salvation that trumped fleeting 
earthly honors. The Spanish condottiero was posited as the archetype for this 
renewed ideal of military asceticism, in which the value of Biblical exempla and 
the revival of crusading tensions intertwined with Counter-Reformation 
spirituality—a line revelatory of the influence that militant Castilian Catholi-
cism exerted over Pope Ghislieri. Abandoning Paul IV’s anti-Habsburg tenden-
cies, he adopted the Spanish example as a model for Christian militia. The Je-
suit Antonio Possevino (1533–1611) was entrusted with the task of transposing 
these ambitions into a concrete pastoral recommendation for the contingent 
commanded by Sforza Sforza, Count of Santa Fiora (1520–75);7 the pope could 
then propose the product as a prototype for all Christian armies. Commis-
sioned to write a suitable catechism for the papal soldiery, Possevino produced 
5 See Enrique García Hernán, “Pio v y el mesianismo profético,” Hispania sacra 45 (1993): 
83–102; Nicole Lemaitre, Saint Pie v (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 42–47; 252–53.
6 Pius v to the Duke of Alba, December 12, 1568 (Goubau, Apostolicarum, 2:110–11).
7 Older brother of Ascanio, cardinal of Santa Fiora, Sforza fought under the banner of Charles 
v (r.1519–56) and Philip ii (r.1556–98) in the Lombardy wars, in the expedition to Algiers, in 
the Schmalkaldic War, in the wars of Parma and Siena and, finally, in the conflict between 
the king of Spain and Paul iv (r.1555–59). Despite his long service for the Habsburgs, thanks 
to the involvement of his brothers in the French army, he was not out of favor with the Valois 
and the cardinal was able to ensure his command of the papal contingent. On his political 
maneuvering to obtain the nomination of the brother as general, see asv, Segreteria di Stato, 
Cardinali, 3.
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a short treatise entitled Il soldato christiano (The Christian soldier), which 
came out during the last months of 1569.8
Since Natalie Davis’s ground-breaking essay on The Rites of Violence, and De-
nis Crouzet’s subsequent extensive contributions, research into the role played 
by preaching in triggering sectarian violence has become well-established,9 
and many of the more interesting studies on religious conflicts have since 
focused on this complex relationship. Comparing French and Flemish distur-
bances, Pollman has showed that violence among the faithful was not the inev-
itable result of Catholic-Protestant confrontation, and that conflict was often 
determined by the type of message conveyed by church authorities.10 Tulchin 
has highlighted the “political” nature of sectarian violence and the leading role 
played by the military in certain French massacres.11 Benedict, finally, has stud-
ied the influence of Huguenot ministers on the political and military conduct 
of the wars of religion. The use of the scriptures, and especially the Old Testa-
ment, as sources from which to draw pointers to political action, led Benedict 
to theorize a form of “prophetic politics” to better understand the motivations 
and choices of the French Reformed church.12 It is a line of study that, if not 
applied too mechanically, may also be useful in interpreting the decisions of 
Pius v.
In a framework of general revival of studies on the role played by religion 
in the disciplinary process within the armies in early modern age, in recent 
years the papal military intervention in the Third War of Religion has attracted 
8 Antonio Possevino, Il soldato christiano con l’instrutione dei capi dello esercito cattolico 
(Rome: Dorici, 1569). For an analysis of this work, see Vincenzo Lavenia, “‘Non arma tract-
are sed animas’: Cappellani cattolici, soldati e catechesi di guerra in età moderna,” Annali 
di storia dell’esegesi 26 (2009): 47–100.
9 Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France,” 
Past and Present 59 (1973): 51–91; Denis Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps 
des troubles de religion (vers 1525 – vers 1610), 2 vols. (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1990); Crouzet, 
Dieu en ses royaumes: Une histoire des guerres de religion (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2008).
10 Judith Pollmann, “Countering the Reformation in France and the Netherlands: Clerical 
Leadership and Catholic Violence 1560–1585,” Past and Present 190 (2006): 83–120.
11 Allan A. Tulchin, That Men Would Praise the Lord: The Triumph of Protestantism in Nîmes, 
1530–1570 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Tulchin, “Massacres during the French 
Wars of Religion,” in Ritual and Violence: Natalie Zemon Davis and Early Modern France, 
ed. Graham Murdock et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 100–26.
12 Philip Benedict, “Religion and Politics in the European Struggle for Stability, 1500–1700,” in 
Early Modern Europe: From Crisis to Stability, ed. Philip Benedict and Myron P.  Gutmann 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005), 120–38. More nuanced, the author 
 re-proposes his interpretation in Benedict, “Prophets in Arms? Ministers in War, Minis-
ters on War: France 1562–1574,” in Ritual and Violence, 163–96.
 563“Dextere sinistram vertere”
journal of jesuit studies 4 (2017) 559-580
<UN>
 particular attention. Brunelli, Zwierlein and, lately, Boltanski have all investi-
gated the episode, linking it to the development of a new international image of 
the papacy during the reign of Pius v.13 In this context, Il soldato christiano can 
be seen as the first and most important sign of the emergence of “an ambitious 
project of religious culture and policy.”14 Possevino’s writing in fact outlined an 
ideal model of a soldier of the Faith, one which moved away from traditional 
aristocratic and knightly archetypes in terms of the fundamental role assigned 
to discipline and obedience in the shaping of martial and religious duties. Il sol-
dato christiano, therefore, appears to be the forerunner of the neo-stoic miles 
perpetuus of Justus Lipsius (1547–1606), and a prototype of the religious litera-
ture specifically designed for the military, which  proliferated throughout the 
early modern period, developing especially in the direction of casuistry and 
thus incidentally revealing the pervasiveness of the  post-Tridentine strategy 
of control of conscience.15 However a dissociation between the gradual emer-
gence of an ideal model—the features of which became increasingly  detailed 
and pronounced—and the real military world, characterized by mercenarism 
and indiscriminate violence, was evident from the outset.
Santa Fiora’s campaign is well-documented: not merely military reports and 
diplomatic letters survive, but also detailed testimonies of the participants in 
the expedition, painting a close-up picture of the real living conditions of sol-
diers, officers and chaplains. The aim of this essay, therefore, is to analyze the 
disciplinary process within the Catholic world, starting from its originally mar-
tial framework, but also to consider, in the French context, the link between 
religious discourse and violence from a perspective that has been rather ne-
glected notwithstanding the prolonged debate on the matter.16 Indeed, while 
the religious susceptibility of crowds and the role of preaching in stirring them 
to tumultuous displays of brutality have been examined, the same cannot be 
said with regard to the soldiers in war, often seen as unreflective instruments 
13 Giampiero Brunelli, Soldati del papa: Politica militare e nobiltà nello Stato della Chiesa 
(1560–1644) (Rome: Carocci, 2003), 11–17; Cornel Zwierlein, “Intention und Funktion, Ma-
chiavellismus und ‘Konfessionalisierung’: Einige Überlegungen zum militärischen Eing-
reifen Papst Pius’ V in die französischen Religionskriege 1569,” in Militär und Religiosität 
in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Michael Kaiser and Stefan Kroll (Münster: Lit, 2004), 145–66; 
Arianne Boltanski, “Forger le ‘soldat chrétien’: L’encadrement catholique des troupes pon-
tificales et royales en France en 1568–1569,” Revue historique 669 (2014): 51–85.
14 Brunelli, Soldati del papa, 11.
15 See Gerhard Oestreich’s classic work, Neostoicism and the Early Modern State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982); Lavenia, “Non arma tractare.”
16 On the historiographical debate, starting with Davis’s study on rites of violence, see Ritual 
and Violence.
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of violence. The quality of the sources also makes it possible to analyze the 
conditions in which the papal intervention was conceived, the effects of Jesuit 
catechesis on the men who made up the papal army, and their reactions to this 
encroachment of “confessionalization,” as well as to what extent the religious 
message propagated by church authorities influenced the violence practiced 
by the warring armies.
 The Jesuits as Military Chaplains
Towards the end of the 1560s, some notable Jesuits had already distinguished 
themselves in the spiritual assistance of soldiers and captains, especially in 
the Mediterranean theater. Initially rather haphazard, this record had not 
only confirmed the image of the Society as an order comparable to the mili-
tary world in terms of organization and discipline, but it also helped delin-
eate a specifically Jesuit approach to pastoral action in relation to soldiers. This 
mission essentially began with the election of Francisco de Borja (in office 
 1565–72) as the third superior general of the Jesuits. He was a knight and an 
aristocrat who gave up worldly fame and honors to lead a life devoted to ascetic 
rigor and evangelical perfection, translating the Ignatian “Meditation on the 
Two Standards” into reality. Under his leadership and through his example, 
there occurred an evolution from the typically Castilian concept of the cru-
sader, one to which the Jesuits seemed at first to adhere, to the definition of an 
organic catechesis for the military. This reflected all the Jesuit pastoral care in 
relation to those who, even while involved in killing, carried out a meritorious 
action and had be on guard against any danger to the soul rather than to the 
body.17 The appearance of Il soldato christiano seems, therefore, to be a point of 
arrival, the codification of an attentiveness towards the religious status of the 
soldiery, which combined the magisterium of Pius v, the missionary zeal of the 
Society, and the pervasiveness of Tridentine strategy of control.
When Possevino returned temporarily to Rome from Avignon, he was ap-
pointed by Borja, at the express wish of the pope, to draft a religious manual 
for the papal troops.18 It was a task he was able to carry out by bringing to bear 
all his past experience in the field. In 1560, when he was still a novice, he had 
17 On the first Jesuit missions within the armies, see Gianclaudio Civale, “La Compagnia di 
Gesù, la guerra e l’immagine del soldato da Ignazio a Possevino (1546–1569),” Società e 
storia 140 (2013): 283–317.
18 arsi, Opp. NN. 337, Possevini annales decas i, books i–ix, f. 53r-v. In February 1569, 
 Possevino had gone to Rome to finalize his affiliation to the Society.
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witnessed the unpreparedness and disarray of Savoyard troops as they engaged 
in a vain attempt to repress the Waldensians, who were constantly urged on by 
their ministers.19 Later in France, after the Peace of Amboise, he was also able 
to observe the unusual career of Edmond Auger (1530–91), the French Jesuit 
who became spiritual adviser to Henry of Anjou. With his work, Le pedagogue 
d’armes, Auger even succeeded in inspiring the drafting of new regulations for 
the French army, which were issued on the eve of the Third War of Religion.20
In his work, echoing the words addressed by the pope to Alba, Possevino 
clearly stated that the soldier at war “puts first not his own interest but rather 
the simple glory of God and the universal good of the Republic, and in so do-
ing he covers himself with Honor and renders himself worthy of every great 
reward.”21 He reclaimed Old Testament examples and connected them to a 
vision—the principal reference being the Exercises—of Christ as the supreme 
condottiero, as the “Captain of Christian soldiers victoriously shedding blood.” 
Possevino depicted for the soldiers an austere and vengeful kind of faith in 
the name of the wrongs suffered by the Lord: like new crusaders, they choose 
to devote themselves to God’s cause. In doing so, he made ample use of the 
Laus novae militiae, written by Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–153) in praise of 
the Knights Templar. He took from the Cistercian saint’s work the traditional 
themes: the death of the Christian soldier as a sacrificial act and the extermi-
nation of heretics and infidels as malicidium not to be regarded as a sin but as 
a praiseworthy action.22 This heroic conception, however, was encased within 
a rigid scheme that held up moral rigor and martial discipline as its most dis-
tinctive qualities. The teaching provided by the Baptist as a singular way of 
salvation for soldiers (“Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and 
be content with your wages,” Luke 3:14) was developed in a detailed list of rec-
ommendations intended to make clear the requirements of the perfect Chris-
tian militia. In an enterprise blessed by God, the general should not only be 
courageous and wise, but also devoted and expert “in matters of faith.” In the 
19 On the Waldensian resistance, see Gianclaudio Civale, “Da martiri a combattenti per la 
fede: La guerra delle valli e le dinamiche della militanza riformata valdese (1555–1561),” 
in Predicazione, eserciti e violenza nell’Europa delle guerre di religione (1560–1715), ed. 
Gianclaudio Civale (Turin: Claudiana, 2014), 157–82.
20 See Austin Lynn Martin, Henry iii and the Jesuit Politicians (Geneva: Droz, 1973); Gian-
claudio Civale, “Religione e mestiere delle armi nella Francia dei primi torbidi religiosi: 
Il ‘pedagogue d’armes’ del gesuita Emond Auger (1568),” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Re-
naissance 74 (2012): 505–33.
21 Possevino, Il soldato christiano, 8. Possevino himself indicates Alba as a prototype of 
“Christian captain” (Possevino, Il soldato christiano, 72–73).
22 Ibid., 12.
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conduct of the campaign, he must “carry God before his eyes” and, therefore, 
be careful to choose only experienced soldiers: those motivated, not by lust for 
glory and riches, but by the nobility of the cause.23
The “holiness” of the soldiers’ mission was designed to break down the soli-
darity typical of men at arms, in order to establish an uncrossable line between 
the Christian militia and the faithless and heretical mob, with whom there 
should be no contact: in Possevino’s view, “You cannot have to do with pitch 
and not be soiled” (Sirach 13:1).24 The Christian soldier had to stay away “from 
heretics and their books”; to banish blasphemy, drunkenness, theft, vainglory, 
lust and gluttony; and behave pacifically towards his fellow soldiers, avoiding 
duels and jousts. However he did have to practice his skills and to keep his 
weapons always in an orderly state.25 In place of sinful occupations, soldiers in 
repose would dedicate themselves to prayer and the reading of uplifting stories 
drawn from the Scriptures, devotional literature and the classics.26 A key role, 
therefore, would be occupied by “preachers in the field, because every com-
pany would have its priest to assist and serve in matters of the spirit."27 “Prayer 
with tears, with fasting, with the most holy sacrifice of the Mass, with the sac-
raments and with preaching,” would endow “the soldiers with greater force” 
because “it must be known that there is no virtue equal to that of prayer.”28 To 
enhance the “virtue” and “fortitude” of the Catholic militias, Possevino pro-
posed a “sequence of prayers […] that the soldier must say,” which reflected the 
intention to “sanctify” the daily life of the military.29
An immediate practical achievement of Possevino’s pamphlet is revealed in 
the inclusion of his provisions in the instructions issued to the commanders of 
the expedition and to the religious figures who would be accompanying them. 
Santa Fiora was reminded that the task had been bestowed upon him because 
it is right to choose a leader “no less a good Christian and true Catholic, and 
attentive to the proper discipline of his men, than one […] valiant” in battle. In 
addition, he was advised
to attempt with all study to introduce into these men the true fear of God, 
without which it can never be hoped to do good, eradicating above all the 
23 Ibid., 17–28.
24 Ibid., 29–34.
25 Ibid., 35–52.
26 Ibid., 57–58.
27 Ibid., 17.
28 Ibid., 23.
29 Ibid., 77–78.
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execrable vices of blasphemy and gambling, the cause of many evils and 
great disorder, and all other vices, repressing military licentiousness […], 
binding the soldiers one to the other and maintaining their obedience, so 
that in such a way all places that they pass through and all the kingdom 
of France may clearly see that good Christians soldiers are sent here, and 
true Catholics, to defend them from the impiety […], and not dissolute 
and rapacious men to plunder them, and this you are charged by His Ho-
liness to do with all possible ardor.30
Religious discipline was adopted as the only antidote to “military licentious-
ness”: the example of these “true Catholics” would function as a tool of pro-
paganda in order to stem the spread of heresy. The importance assigned to 
the military expedition was reaffirmed in the orders issued to the bishop of 
Fermo, Lorenzo Lenzi (1516–71), the army’s commissioner and treasurer.31 His 
responsibilities should have been limited to the management of logistic and 
the supervision of payments;32 but the pope was keen to give him wider pow-
ers, involving a vicarial role that included both pastoral functions and spiritual 
policing. His task, in fact, was to ensure “that these men would serve as an 
example in religion, obedience and discipline for the wretched.” To this end, 
he was required to take “special care for the avoidance of commerce and of 
sinning through colloquy and dispute with heretics.” Finally, no one of any de-
gree or condition should possess suspicious or prohibited books or writings: 
“in this you are commanded by His Holiness to employ the utmost diligence 
[…] with the most rigorous interdictions and penalties.”33 This plan of inquisi-
torial surveillance was inserted within a system of indulgences that reflected 
the revival of the traditional crusader spirit. In fact, with a brief of March 10, 
1569, the pope gave to Lenci special powers to absolve from all sins “etiam Sedi 
Apostolicae reservatis” and accord the soldiers “plenary indulgence in articulo 
30 “Istruttione al conte di S.ta Fiore generale delle genti mandati da Pio V in Francia,” Rome, 
March 9, 1569. asv, Fondo Pio 112, ff. 20r–24v. See a copy in bav, Barb. Lat., 5040, ff. 77v–80r.
31 Lenzi was a favorite of Catherine and Cosimo de’ Medici (r.1537–69) and, like Pope 
 Ghislieri, he had benefited from the patronage of Paul iv. He had spent many years in 
France as papal delegate and as vice-legate at Avignon, where he had distinguished him-
self in the repression of the Huguenots. Stefano Simoncini, “Lenzi, Lorenzo,” in Dizion-
ario biografico degli italiani, vol. 64 (http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/lorenzo-lenzi 
_(Dizionario- Biografico), accessed May 2, 2017).
32 Gianpiero Brunelli, “I commissari generali dell’esercito pontificio tra Cinque e Seicento,” 
Dimensioni e problemi della ricerca storica 2 (2004): 175–206.
33 “Istruttioni al vescovo di Fermo commissario delle genti mandati da Pio V in Francia,” 
Rome, March 9, 1569 (asv, Fondo Pio 112, ff. 28r–32v).
Civale
journal of jesuit studies 4 (2017) 559-580
<UN>
568
mortis.”34 The delegated exercise of these prerogatives was the task of the mili-
tary chaplains assigned to the army.35
Thus, by order of the pope, Borja selected five Jesuits from amongst the staff 
of the colleges of Perugia, Macerata, and Loreto: the areas where the recruit-
ment of the soldiers generally took place. Their duties were to run the infirma-
ry and to ensure the spiritual discipline of the soldiers. Appointed head of the 
mission, the rector of the college of Perugia, Curzio Amodei, received a series 
of instructions, which stated that
the main purpose of this mission is to ensure that the Italian soldiery sent 
by His Holiness goes about its business with true Christianity because 
thus it may be hoped that God will receive the greater assistance […] to 
establish true religion and pacify the Kingdom of France.
The Jesuits were to set an example of Christian life, demonstrating “love and 
modesty” and to teach soldiers to “hold high intention […] in this endeavor.” At 
stake, indeed, were “the honor of God, and the increase and exaltation of the 
holy Catholic faith, and the common good.” With sermons, daily masses, “lita-
nies, Salve regina, and other prayers,” they would attempt to “persuade them 
that the more they were virtuous and in the grace of God, the more courageous 
and valiant would they be.” In so doing, “God’s protection would be drawn to 
them and so greater success would be given to their endeavors.” In sermons, 
but also in more informal moments of catechesis, the Jesuits were to urge them 
to “withdraw from those sins that were wont to be familiar to this kind of men,” 
helping to prevent the rise of any “enmity” for “honor and personal interest." 
Finally, the priests should be dedicated to administering the sacrament of pen-
ance and letting it be known they were available to hear the soldiers’ confes-
sions “both day and night”—rather briskly, however, so that, with battle near, 
they might purify as many people as possible with absolution.36 The piety of 
the soldiers was to be stimulated through the distribution of Il soldato chris-
tiano, printed in convenient octavo copies for ease of use, and other devotional 
34 asv, Segreteria Brevi, Registri 12, 101.
35 To maintain the group of Jesuits, Amodei was paid fifty scudi a month, a far from negli-
gible figure. The same amount was paid to the sergeant major of the army, Saporoso Mat-
teucci (1515–78). To compare, the mestre de camp earned one hundred scudi, the bishop of 
Fermo, three hundred, and the general, five hundred. asv, Archivum Arcis, Arm. i–xviii, 
3952, s.f.
36 “Instruttione per quelli che si mandano in Francia col campo del papa,” arsi, Inst. 117a, ff. 
290r–291v.
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works, as well as the gift of “rosaries or prayer books.” In Jesuit strategy, the 
army seemed to offer a fresh new terrain for their mission, for the spiritual 
instruction and transformation of that particular category of the faithful. The 
unusual path to salvation available to soldiers, however, requiring the presence 
of priests, seemed to involve, at least in the Catholic version, a certain degree 
of “clericalization” of the army. As for other human occupations, ecclesiastical 
control was both a symptom and a product of the model engendered by an 
orderly and religiously directed society.
 Jesuits and Devotion in the Papal Army
Amodei’s regular letters, along with the diary of the French campaign kept in 
the Vatican Library,37 represent sources of great value not only for studying 
an army from within, but also because they offer an opportunity to verify the 
practical effects of the religious and ideological initiative sponsored by Pius v. 
From April 1569, the troops began to arrive in the plain of Volpiano, a few 
leagues from Turin. The Jesuits joined them there at the beginning of May. At 
the suggestion of Santa Fiora, they waited a few days to begin their ministries, 
until the companies had received their money. This seemed a wise move, and 
Amodei reported with satisfaction that “we waited to take confession as the 
soldiers were paid and by the grace of the Lord we did not lack work to do and 
confessed many, and many more would have been confessed if they had not 
been prevented by inspections.”
At this early stage, the atmosphere in the camp was a very orderly one. 
Inspection was the occasion to promulgate some prohibitions regarding gam-
bling and blasphemy, but even before this, Amodei reported that “the sol-
diers are as well-behaved with each other as one could wish, and even before 
they were paid and no prohibition was established they were not heard to 
blaspheme.”38 The soldiers’ contentment was also reflected in their attitude 
towards the Jesuits: “we have an excellent crowd, and […] it seems that we have 
always known one another and that we belong all to the same  profession.” He 
37 “Narratione della Guerra di Francia seguita l’anno 1569. Dove […] Santa Fiora fu capitano 
generale della gente italiana mandata da N.S.r Pio v,” bav, Barb. Lat. 5040, ff. 76r–181v. 
 Zwierlein attributes the manuscript to Rovio Belmonte, secretary of the general. With 
almost daily annotations, it covers a time span ranging from May 6 to December 1569, 
describing the journey made by the main part of the contingent, from its first assembly in 
the Canavese region to its disbanding in Susa, seven months later.
38 Amodei to Borja, Volpiano, May 5 and 10, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, ff. 59–60.
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was eager to record that his brothers were kept busy “in confessing continuous-
ly from the early hours of the morning until lunchtime, and then after lunch 
until the evening, so I truly have the impression of being in the Holy Peniten-
tiary [Sacra penitenzieria].”39 Therefore, auricular confession was confirmed as 
the cornerstone of the Jesuit spiritual program also with regard to men-at-arms. 
Even more than public sermons, the sacrament of penance appeared to be a 
flexible tool to induce the required change of behavior that would create a 
more authentic Christian military service.
The soldiers, as Santa Fiora indicated, seemed to be prone to unexpected 
demonstrations of obedience and devotion, as long as they were satiated and 
content. This cheerful state of mind would last until the troops made their way 
into the war zone. From Lyon, where they received a festive welcome, Amodei 
wrote that the soldiers acted “very modestly, so that those of the city […] were 
full of admiration for their behavior, knowing them neither to blaspheme nor 
indulge in gambling […], and I think that it will be written to His Holiness of 
the good odor they will leave of themselves.” Abstention from gambling and 
blasphemy was seen as the main symptom of success of the Jesuit mission in 
terms of a moral reform of the army. An exemplary anti-heretical effect was 
also envisaged. The confidence of the Jesuits, however, was questioned by those 
who, more experienced in such matters, were aware that, as the campaign pro-
gressed, the soldiers “would go to ruin through the bad example of others.”40 
Such concerns about maintaining discipline amongst the troops were destined 
to become a reality. Just twenty days later, in Limousin, Amodei was forced 
to confirm to his superiors that, due to difficulties with provisioning, “things 
with our soldiers have gone very badly, because on the road they have done 
little else but thieve and do harm.”41 From Lyon, the expedition had proceeded 
by forced marches through a region that had already experienced the passage 
of the royal armies and the Huguenot troops: there was little left. Afflicted by 
shortage of food, despite the risk of draconian punishment from the officers, 
the soldiers tended to leave the road to wander through the countryside and 
extort whatever they needed from the local population.42 Before arriving in 
Lyon, Santa Fiora had hanged a soldier over a simple matter of insubordina-
tion, to demonstrate to the others that “if they will not be obedient, then they 
39 Amodei to Borja, Volpiano, May 16, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, f. 63.
40 Amodei to Borja, Lyon, June 4, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, f. 70. In Lyon, the Jesuits could count 
on the help and advice of Auger.
41 Amodei to Borja, June 26, 1569, campo del re. arsi, Gall. 82, f. 82.
42 arsi, Gall. 82, f. 109v.
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will be most severely punished.”43 Amodei had been on hand to confess the 
condemned man and accompany him “to the place of justice, comforting him 
along the way and with a crucifix in hand, and with the Lord’s grace he acted 
most well, and before he died pronounced some words of edification […] and 
was a great example.”44 The severity of the sentence imposed by the count, 
who had ordered a punishment contrary “to strict military reason,” seemed to 
be inspired by Possevino’s teachings: the Jesuit, in fact, had advised the officers 
to be inflexible in their punishment of those responsible for “discord” in or-
der to furnish tangible examples of authentic Christian discipline.45 Amodei’s 
intervention had turned the execution into a religious ceremony, the goal of 
which, following the paradigm that underlay the brotherhood’s activity on be-
half of comfort for the “afflicted,” was not the punishment, but the exemplary 
reconciliation of the convict.46
However, after this episode there was no sign of cooperation between army 
officers and church representatives to establish the double parameters—
religious and military—of an ideal pattern of conduct. Executions, duly 
recorded by the campaign diary, were repeated with frequency, showing a su-
perficial reception of the new form of behavior preached by the Jesuits. And 
if, in the early stages of the march, commands were issued that “every soldier 
is obliged to hear Mass” on the Feast of Corpus Christi,47 thereafter the count 
and all his officers seemed to neglect any assistance to the Jesuits. Amodei was 
forced to admit that “not only are we not helped in carrying out our ministry, 
but we are hindered.” It was even decided to use a chapel that stood near the 
military quarters for storage and the fathers were deprived of the chance of 
“preaching, saying Mass, and hearing confession.”48
Absorbed into a predominantly mercenary army, composed of seventeen 
thousand infantries and eleven thousand cavalries,49 the papal troops had 
to suffer, even more than previously, from scarcity of supplies. Their excesses 
earned them an official reprimand from the duke of Anjou, who ordered  Santa 
43 bav, Barb. Lat. 4904, ff. 87v–88r.
44 Amodei to Borja, Lyon, June 4, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, f. 70.
45 Possevino, Il soldato christiano, 38.
46 See Adriano Prosperi, Delitto e perdono: La pena di morte nell’orizzonte mentale dell’Europa 
cristiana, xiv–xviii secolo (Turin: Einaudi, 2013).
47 bav, Barb. Lat. 4904, f. 102v.
48 Amodei to Borja, June 26, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, f. 82.
49 The most detailed study on the Third War of Religion is yet Stèphan C. Gigon’s La 
Troisième Guerre de Religion: Jarnac-Moncontour (1568–69) (Paris: Lavauzelles, 1909). See 
James B. Wood, The King’s Army: Warfare, Soldiers, and Society during the French Wars of 
Religion, 1562–1576 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16–28.
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Fiora to punish with their lives those responsible for looting and violence 
against the population.50 At the beginning of July, Amodei admitted that “our 
army proceeds very badly, both for the disorder they make and for blasphemy 
and gambling.”51 The Christian discipline that the pope intended to be the 
clearest attribute of the papal army, and even the “good odor” that the soldiers 
had at first left behind them as they passed, seemed to have evaporated. The 
Jesuits, however, had no time to complain. War and hunger paved the way for 
another scourge: the plague. In order to cope with the increasing number of 
patients, the Jesuits were granted the equipment to set up a field hospital. Un-
til their return, their correspondence with Rome became a series of laments 
regarding the conditions of the sick and the many dead. By the end of July, 
Amodei was predicting that “few Italians will return” and confessed to Borja 
that “if the pope knew how greatly the army suffers […], I think by this time he 
would have called his soldiers home.”52 At the end of August, the commanders 
were forced to leave the priests at Tours, where at least seven hundred sick had 
been hospitalized. In his instructions issued to the chaplains, Borja had ex-
plicitly told them to not “allow the sick and injured to lack for anything in the 
needs of the body, or of the soul”; and the priests had been urged “to confess 
them as soon as it is possible […], commending their souls.”53 The chaplains, 
therefore, dedicated themselves with passion to assist the dying—something 
which was one of the specific ministries of the Societas—and neglected their 
work of ministry to the soldiers in the field. In these circumstances, Lelio San-
guigno was still able to find reason to praise the Lord for the fact that the sick 
“are at least helped in their souls and do not lack nourishment for the spirit.”54 
In their efforts to aid the sick, all five members of the mission fell ill, and San-
guigno himself died.
The news of the victory at Moncontour, as triumphant as it was unexpected, 
arrived in Tours on October 4, when Amodei was preparing to send back 350 
to four hundred soldiers to Italy, all of them too sick or seriously injured to be 
useful for service.55 The victory gave Santa Fiora the opportunity to plead to 
the king of France for “authorization to return to Italy.” Only when the king 
50 The Duke of Anjou to Santa Fiora, Lassac, July 3, 1569. asv, Segreteria di Stato, Cardinali 3, 
198. The count seemed to sympathize with his troops and “out of compassion he did not 
punish according to rigor of the law.” bav, Barb. Lat. 4904, f. 149r.
51 Amodei to Borja, Objat, July 4, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, f. 86.
52 Amodei to Borja, Pernac, July 21, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, f. 100.
53 arsi, Inst. 117a, f. 291v.
54 Lelio Sanguigno to Borja, Montbazon, August 6, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, f. 112.
55 Amodei to Borja, Tours, October 8, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, f. 160.
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reached the walls of Saint-Jean-d’Angely and was able to see for himself the se-
riousness of the situation, did he grant leave to the Italian troops. The journey 
home was afflicted by the “great sickness that was generally in all the people.” 
Santa Fiora himself fell ill and had to abandon his leadership of the contingent, 
preceded by many other officers who had preferred to hasten back to Italy in 
advance. Left to itself, the army, “exhausted and distressed, took itself where 
best it could.”56 In Lyon, orders came from Rome that the army should turn 
back to Avignon; but many soldiers, scattered as they were, were taking to the 
road to Savoy. They did not even wait for payment, for “so many of them were 
weary of being held back by those groups among whom nothing was to be seen 
but sickness and death.”57
 Religious Violence?
Santa Fiora expressed his strong opposition to the injunctions of Pius v that 
postponed the return of his men to Italy.58 Demoralized and offended by what 
he considered an intrusion into his sphere of command, he chose to retire to 
his own estates, without passing through Rome at all. Thus, the expedition 
ended in inglorious dissolution, while at the papal court Santa Fiora’s act of in-
subordination brought only disgrace to his name. It was based on the impossi-
bility of continuing the campaign that had lost almost all its military strength. 
While the sources do not make it realistic to follow the gradual diminution 
of the troops in detail, there is one fact that seems to suggest the scope of the 
contingent’s disintegration: at the beginning of October, on the battlefield of 
Moncontour, out of the 5,400 soldiers that made up the original army, only 
1,850 were fit to take the field.59 The rest were dead, or lay sick or wounded, 
or had abandoned their units. In general, foreign contingents were less prone 
to desertion en masse, mainly because of the difficulties of being able to re-
turn home. This was something that can only have partially affected the Ital-
ian army. Amodei himself seemed to share the sense of disillusionment that 
pervaded the troops when, from Turin, he wrote to his superiors of the “great 
danger of going to Avignon,” and the risk of prolonging a grueling experience 
he had survived only thanks to the refusal of the soldiers and to their “morose 
56 An avviso from Lyon refers to the arrival of “vestiges of the Italians […], utterly spent and 
enfeebled, and no more in the form of men.” December 4, bav, Urb. Lat. 1041–i, f. 194v.
57 bav, Barb. Lat. 4904, ff. 171r–172v.
58 Ibid., f. 175r-v.
59 Ibid., ff. 165v–166r.
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dissatisfaction” that had prompted the pope to desist from his purpose.60 It 
is possible, therefore, that, although far from home, various bands of soldiers 
had decided to desert, running the risk of encountering enemy contingents or 
ambushes from peasants enraged by looting.
The constant attrition which units were subject to explained the ragged fits-
and-starts nature of the whole campaign from the beginning. It was dogged by 
halts, then featured moments of great vitality thanks to the injection of fresh 
reinforcements, and then further halts as they waited to join up with new at-
tachments of troops.61 The disposition of the papal contingent followed a simi-
lar pattern. On its arrival, it revitalized the Catholic army and was deployed 
in some skirmishes, in the battle of Roche-l’Abeille, where victory went to the 
Huguenots, in relieving besieged Poitiers and in the assault on the stronghold 
of Châtellerault. At this point, it seemed to lose any fighting spirit. As a conse-
quence, the royal army’s activity stalled until its ranks were replenished by the 
arrival of new French forces.
In a conflict characterized by attrition rather than by decisive battle, the tac-
tics that brought victory were those employed by Alba in Flanders. As Posse-
vino himself reported, the Duke had managed to maintain offensive potential 
longer than his opponents.62 To achieve this, however, the soldiers needed to 
be supported with adequate logistics and health care and at least the promise 
of payment. Imposition of an iron discipline, loyalty to a cause, and faith in 
leadership were all factors that made it possible to overcome the privations of 
war. Subjected to the harsh conditions of the French Civil War, the papal army 
had not been up to the task: they had fallen apart as easily as a force made up 
of mercenaries. Pius v’s dream of forming a new military crusade that, by vir-
tue of its faith, might assist the Catholics of France and then continue its mis-
sion in Flanders, in the Comtat Venaissin, or in any other endangered region, 
evaporated into nothing.63
If the efforts of the Jesuit chaplains had little effect on changing the ungodly 
behavior of the soldiery, the question remains to what extent the pontiff ’s ap-
peal for the massacre of heretics, partly derived from Possevino, influenced the 
papal army’s actual performance in battle. The message regarding the extermi-
nation of the enemy as an act of religious purification, subversive in content, 
60 Amodei to Borja, Turin, December 31, 1569. arsi, Ital. 137, ff. 368–69.
61 See Wood, King’s Army, 229–37.
62 Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt (New York: Penguin, 1984, 2nd edition), 105–10.
63 The instructions by Pius v to Santa Fiora prescribed that, after the operations in France, 
the contingent would move to garrison in Avignon or to provide assistance against the 
Flemish rebels. asv, Fondo Pio 112, ff. 20r–24v.
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could benefit from the sanction of officialdom within a military context where 
obedience was one of the principal values. It seems to explain the central role 
played by soldiers and “paramilitary” combatants, such as the militias, in car-
rying out most of the massacres that took place during the French Wars.64 The 
violence inflicted by the papal forces upon the population was predominantly 
predatory in nature, taking the form of plunder rather than the actual elimina-
tion of civilians. Moreover, sources do not depict the latter in terms of any par-
ticular religious shading. Nevertheless, it still remains to be clarified to what 
extent military conflict was subject to the “sacralization of war” put forward in 
speeches and at a ritual level.
In the battle at Roche-l’Abeille, on June 25, the papal force was called back 
hastily into the field. They maintained their positions but did not support the 
advance of the French infantry, thus allowing the semi-encirclement and cap-
ture of the mestre de camp, Filippo Strozzi. The Italians offered a better ac-
count of themselves on September 7, under the walls of Châtellerault. Leading 
the first wave of the assault to a breach, however, they were repelled with heavy 
losses by defenders who were emboldened at facing the soldiers of the pope.65 
On both occasions, the Jesuits were to the rear, with no way either to hear con-
fession or to deliver sermons before the fight. Their function, it appears, was 
restricted to looking after the wounded and dying, to the reaffirmation of the 
salvific value of confession, especially for those who needed, on their death-
beds, to be reconciled with the Lord. This is confirmed not only by their con-
cern for the sick, but also by the speed with which, in July, near Pernac, Amodei 
wanted to reach the site of a skirmish in order to provide the last sacraments 
and ensure the indulgence in articulo mortis for several soldiers.66
Nor were the Jesuit chaplains able to be present at other feats of arms in 
which the Italian troops took part. The failed Huguenot siege of Poitiers, be-
tween late July and September, constituted a turning point in the entire cam-
paign. Recognizing the strategic importance of the city, the Catholic leaders 
had been transferring since August numerous troops to the forces of Henri de 
Guise. These included four hundred harquebusiers and two hundred Italian 
cavalries under the command of Paolo Sforza. The citadel provides us with a 
privileged place to observe the cohesive power of religion, its language, its de-
pictions and its results.67 The siege also represents an extreme situation from 
64 See Tulchin, Massacres, 100–26.
65 bav, Barb. Lat. 4904, f. 153r-v.
66 Amodei from Pernac, July 21, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, f.100.
67 For the siege and its religious implications, see Cornel Zwierlein, “Fame, violenza e re-
ligione politicizzata: Gli assedi nelle guerre confessionali,” in Militari e società civile 
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a religious point of view, with the barrier between the two faiths becoming a 
palpable reality, embodied in the walls that separated the besieged from the 
besiegers. For the authorities of the city, its defense was not just a matter of 
survival and protection; it took on a transcendental sense: the superiority of 
their faith over that of the opposing army. The symbols of religion became 
treasures to preserve, even to the point of martyrdom: and above all, they were 
icons from which fresh vigor could be drawn to sustain the struggle against the 
enemy.
The chronicle of the siege published by Marin Liberge (1537–99) in 1572 reg-
isters a climate of great religious tension, and cites many incidents where the 
defenders offered evidence of their devotion. Several of these also involved 
the papal troops. The author recalls how, after the pontifical forces had suc-
cessfully defended a breach, Paolo Sforza, brother of Santa Fiora, wanted to 
offer up the still-bloodstained clothes he had worn during the engagement as 
a pledge of his faith. Even more indicative of the strength of religious feeling 
than this rather macabre votive offering was an oath pronounced by the Ital-
ians before rushing to repel yet another assault. They were harangued by an 
officer, who asked them rhetorically “if they were ready […] to show what they 
had promised to do in all this war, namely to commit their lives to the defense 
of the Christian religion, the Holy See and the Most Christian King […]. If they 
intended, therefore, to conduct themselves in combat, not as foreigners and 
Italians, but as good and true Christians.” To this appeal, the soldiers answered 
with a form of Roman salute, “their hands to the sky,” and swore before an 
image of Christ “to die rather than betray their duty.” Then they went into the 
cathedral where the relics of St. Radegund were kept, and, as battle and the 
possibility of death beckoned, kneeling, they commended their souls to God 
with “prayers and humble vows.”68 This unexpected show of devotion on the 
part of foreign soldiers who had been perceived as little more than mercenar-
ies, with no interest in the French religious cause, aroused admiration and in-
stilled a spirit of emulation.
It is impossible to ascertain whether such an uplifting ceremony actually 
took place, or if it owes more to the hyperbole of the chronicler. However, it re-
mains the only evidence of the papal troops laying swearing to defend the faith 
until death, making an oath that, in Pius v’s plans, was to be imperative for 
every Catholic army. The days preceding Moncontour, on October 6, took place 
nell’Europa dell’età moderna (secoli xvi–xvii), ed. Claudio Donati and Bernard Kroener 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), 497–545.
68 Marin Liberge, Le siège de Poitiers suivi de la bataille de Moncontour et du siège de St Jean 
d’Angély, ed. Henri Beauchet-Filleau (Poitiers: Letang, 1846), 81–83.
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in a climate of growing exasperation further exacerbated by fatigue, hunger, 
and death. The situation was a critical one, which could have also fostered the 
revival of chiliastic anxieties stimulated by religious figures. At Tours, while the 
Italian Jesuits were committed to assisting the sick, Possevino himself was on 
hand to play a significant role in rousing the soldiers’ spirits with his sermons. 
He was even heard by the royal family, who had arrived to follow the campaign 
up close. Possevino intended his penitential homilies to “awaken the Christian 
choirs to do their duty here at least with tears and prayer, because all around us 
now nothing is understood but death and the most melancholic indifference 
towards the things of the Lord Our God.” In an attempt to appease “the wrath 
of God” and invite His benevolence, the Jesuit tried to promote anti-heretical 
devotional practices, such as the cult of the Blessed Sacrament. Thanks to the 
wishes of the Cardinal of Lorraine, the Duke of Anjou also introduced the ven-
eration of Corpus Christi into the nearby army camp. The sacramental bread 
was exhibited in a church in the middle of the military quarters and, during a 
visit from the king, was carried along a processional route to the town church 
of Saint Martin. Here, Possevino preached before an audience of four thou-
sand persons.69
Despite the flurry of religious activity in the previous days, sources men-
tion no devotional event taking place on the field of Moncontour. The Jesuits, 
Possevino and the bishop of Fermo, were otherwise engaged. No one was pres-
ent to bless the soldiers as the time of battle grew near. Nevertheless, certain 
details suggest the religious nature of the conflict. In order to be able to rec-
ognize each other, the Catholic troops adopted white crosses as distinguishing 
features—the same crosses that had appeared for the first time at the Battle of 
Saint-Denis and would be worn during the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre. In 
addition, according to Marshal Tavannes (1555–1630), Catholics attacked with 
shouts of “au nom de Dieu!”70
The battle was short-lived, lasting only half an hour.71 As in several other 
battles in the French Wars of Religion, the two cavalries clashed with each 
other with no prior tactics being decided: to all intents and purposes, it was a 
trial by ordeal, as if only individual valor and God’s favor to would decide the 
outcome. On the right flank, Italian squadrons fought against Huguenot cav-
alry and some companies of German reiters. The battle soon degenerated into 
69 Possevino to Borja, Tours, September 10, 1569. arsi, Opp. NN. 324–ii, 186, 189.
70 Jean de Saulx, Mémoires de […] Gaspard de Saulx, seigneur de Tavannes (Paris: Neufchaise, 
1653), 356.
71 François de La Noue, Discours politiques et militaires, ed. Frank E. Sutcliffe (Geneva: Droz, 
1967), 760–66.
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a melee between isolated groups of combatants. The decisive move was made 
with an advance to the center by the square of Swiss Catholics, who routed 
the enemy cavalry. The Huguenot infantry remained isolated, at the mercy of 
the Catholic horsemen and the infantry who moved up to support them.72  
As the Protestant forces retreated in disarray, the conflict was transformed into 
a massacre. The regiment of four thousand Landsknechts in the service of the 
Huguenots attempted to withdraw in an orderly fashion, only to be surrounded 
and massacred by the Swiss. Some have attributed this particularly ferocious 
episode to the long-standing rivalry between two nations who were direct 
competitors in the mercenary market. Contemporary evidence, however, sug-
gest a more complex reality in which military logic became intertwined with 
religious hatred. According to François de La Noue (1531–91) and La Popelin-
ière (1541–1608), the Swiss were animated above all by a spirit of revenge for 
the defeats suffered in Roche-l’Abeille and in Béarn, where the Catholic com-
mander had been executed. No Swiss units, however, had been present at 
these conflicts. The extermination of the Landsknechts, therefore, was not so 
much due to their role as mercenaries, but rather to the fact that they were 
heretics, for whom total destruction had been decreed. Many of them, in fact, 
in a vain attempt to save their lives, cried out “with clasped hands and knees 
to the earth […], ‘Bon Papiste! Bon Papiste, moy!’”; but the victors were deaf 
to their pleas.73 The Catholics wanted to put all their enemies to the sword, 
including the French. The fury was both absolute and liberating: a reaction 
that seems to have emerged from the feelings of pollution analyzed by Davis. 
Only a tardy command from the Duke of Anjou put an end to the extermina-
tion. Meanwhile an unknown number of Huguenots—something between six 
and ten thousand men—were left on the field. Just a few gentlemen, handed 
over as prisoners to Catholic aristocrats, were granted their lives in exchange 
for the promise of a heavy ransom. On the opposing side, the losses did not 
exceed seven hundred men, mainly amongst the cavalry, including those of the 
papal forces. In the Jesuits’ eyes, they had won entry to the kingdom of Heaven. 
Amodei himself interpreted the battle as a malicidium. Commenting on the 
death of an Italian gentleman from injuries sustained in combat, he wrote: “We 
said the Masses, and prayed to our Lord for his soul; God grant that these were 
72 The first description of the battle reached Rome in an avviso from Paris, October 15, 1569. 
bav, Urb. Lat. 1041–i, ff. 168r–169v.
73 Henri Lancelot Voisin de Popelinière, La vraye et entière histoire des trouble et choses mé-
morables, avenues tant en France qu’en Flandres […] depuis l’an 1562 (Geneva: Davantes, 
1573), f. 183v.
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 accepted, even though I trust that there will be little need for them, for one 
who died for the faith in so just and honorable war.”74
In a context where celestial design intersected with worldly reality, the cred-
it for the victory was attributed entirely to the Lord and to the wonders that 
He performed for his followers. Suffering and hardship assumed providential 
significance, in a journey of atonement and redemption which led Catholics 
to see themselves as interpreters of His justice. Unlike battles such as Lepanto 
or Jarnac, sources do not record the singing of the Te Deum on the battlefield: 
since the Crusades, combatants had given thanks to the Lord in this way, giv-
ing rise to a sort of “liturgization” of the battle. However, it is likely that these 
prayers did in fact take place, given the presence of a general such as the Duke 
of Anjou, a man of deep and tormented religious feelings who, in the after-
math of the fighting, expressed his intention to build a memorial chapel on the 
site of the battle.75 Certainly, news of the triumph was celebrated throughout 
France and in Paris, where the royal family attended solemn ceremonies of 
thanksgiving.76 But the principal theater for the political-religious elaboration 
of the battle of Moncontour was Rome, where the pope was quick to align 
the events with biblical teachings. The news of the victory was greeted with 
demonstrations of joy, the ringing of bells, and solemn processions. The entire 
Curia took part in these celebrations, as did the pope himself.77 As after the 
Jarnac, the twenty-six enemy standards captured by papal soldiers were sent 
to Rome where, in January 1570, they were dragged through the mud during a 
triumphal procession and then exhibited in St. Peter’s.78
Although the final outcome of the war was highly unsatisfactory, ending 
with the Peace of Saint-Germain—a renewal of the limited religious freedom 
that had been enjoyed by the Huguenots that enraged Pius v—the deployment 
of a pontifical force in France did serve to revitalize the role of Rome. The cha-
risma of the Dominican pope helped to kindle the fires of religious hatred in a 
French context, where events were heading towards the atrocities of Saint Bar-
tholomew’s Eve. But meanwhile, discourses based on the desire to exterminate 
74 Amodei to Borja, Tours, October 8, 1569. arsi, Gall. 82, ff. 161–62.
75 bav, Barb. Lat. 4904, f. 167r-v. The news was also in an avviso dated October 9. bav, Urb. Lat. 
1041–i, ff. 163v–164r.
76 Jacques-August de Thou, Mémoires de Condé […], contenant ce qui s’est passé de plus mé-
morable en Europe (Paris: Rollin, 1743), 1:410.
77 Avviso from Rome, October 22. bav, Urb. Lat. 1041–i, f. 167r.
78 Avviso, January 7, 1570. bav, Urb. Lat. 1041–i, ff. 210v–211r. For the processions to celebrate 
the battles of Jarnac and Moncontour in the context of the papal rituality, see Maria A. 
Visceglia, La città rituale: Roma e le sue cerimonie in età moderna (Rome: Viella, 2002), 
201–27.
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the enemy of the faith, the crusading ideal, and the millennial expectations 
that such tensions awakened had found their most complete realization in the 
struggle against the Turks. This had led to the Battle of Lepanto, a pivotal event 
for the Counter-Reformation sensibility. It was precisely in the last Mediter-
ranean crusade that Possevino’s model of Il soldato christiano found its full ap-
plication, thanks to the efforts of the ecclesiastical authorities and papal and 
Spanish policies.79 But even the experience of Lepanto proved ephemeral in 
terms of the moral reform of the army. The commitment of Jesuits and other 
chaplains could be fruitful in stimulating devotion among troops, and occa-
sionally served to encourage and justify confessional violence; but it was far 
less successful in enforcing compliance with the obligations of Tridentine Ca-
tholicism and in providing a moral framework helpful to establishing effective 
military discipline. Soldiers needed not only religious inspiration but prompt 
and reliable pay, efficient logistical services, constant drill, honest and judi-
cious commands. These were all conditions that European states for a long 
time would not have been able to provide. When, finally, an army correspond-
ing to the theoretical canons appeared, it was not Catholic but Protestant. 
Much more than Catholicism, the Calvinist doctrine, with its reference to in-
dividual effort, the perseverance in the Gospel and the immediate relationship 
between religion and state, lent itself to the identification of religious motives 
with national ones. Conversely, the soldato christiano, postulated by Possevino 
and promoted by Pius v, involved an appeal to an increasingly anachronistic 
model and the necessity of a constant ecclesiastical presence like a medium 
between the concrete activity of the war and the transcendent need for justi-
fication and salvation.
79 Gianclaudio Civale, Guerrieri di Cristo: Inquisitori, gesuiti e soldati alla battaglia di Lepanto 
(Milan: Unicopli, 2009).
